











During	 World	 War	 Two,	 South	 Africa	 inaugurated	 the	 Civilian	 Protective	 Services	
organisation	 as	 a	 civil	 defence	 effort	 to	 deal	 with,	 inter	 alia,	 the	 preventive	 and	
protective	measures	in	defence	of	the	civilian	population	against	attack	from	the	air	
and	 the	 sea,	 and	against	 the	dangers	 arising	 from	sabotage	and	sudden	emergency.	
Between	1940	and	1945,	about	80	000	civilians	volunteered	for	service	in	the	air	raid	
precautions	 and	 the	 civilian	 guard	 sections	 of	 the	 Civilian	 Protective	 Services,	 to	
contribute	towards	a	national	defence	effort	of	the	Union	of	South	Africa.	This	article	
examines	 the	 origin	 of	 the	 Civilian	 Protective	 Services	 and	 its	 development	 during	
World	War	Two,	within	 the	 context	 of	 South	Africa’s	 political	 and	 internal	 security	
challenges.	 It	 contends	 that	 the	 institution	of	 the	 Civilian	Protective	 Services	was	 a	
vital	 element	 in	South	Africa’s	effort	 to	enhance	 internal	 security,	 to	assuage	public	








Tydens	 die	 Tweede	 Wêreldoorlog,	 het	 Suid‐Afrika	 die	 Burgerlike	
Beskermingsdienste‐organisasie	ingestel	as	deel	van	’n	breër	burgerlike	beskermings	
poging	om,	onder	meer,	die	voorkomende	en	beskermings	maatreëls	ter	verdediging	
van	 die	 bevolking	 teen	 anvalle	 vanuit	 die	 lug	 en	 die	 see	 te	 hanteer,	 asook	 teen	 die	
gevare	 van	 sabotasie	 en	 skielike	 noodgevalle.	 Tussen	 1940	 en	 1945,	 het	 ongeveer	



















asook	 die	 afdeling	 wat	 verantwoordelik	 was	 vir	 die	 implimentering	 van	
voorsorgmaatreëls	 teen	 moontlike	 lugaanvalle.	 Hierdie	 artikel	 ondersoek	 die	
oorsprong	 van	 die	 Burgerlike	 Beskermingsdienste,	 en	 die	 ontwikkeling	 daarvan,	
tydens	 die	 Tweede	 Wêreldoorlog,	 veral	 binne	 die	 konteks	 van	 Suid‐Afrika	 se	
politieke‐	 en	 interne	 veiligheidsuitdagings.	 Die	 artikel	 bevind	 dat	 die	 instelling	 van	
die	Burgerlike	Beskermingsdienste	ŉ	belangrike	 element	 van	 Suid‐Afrika	 se	 poging	












areas	 were	 targets	 of	 aerial	 assaults.1	 This	 was	 experienced	 during	 the	 Great	War	
(1914–1918)	 in	 Europe,	 when	 the	 German	 Zeppelin	 airships	 and	 Gotha	 bombers	
embarked	 on	 air	 raids	 against	 Britain	 and	 France,	 subjecting	 London	 and	 Paris	 to	
bombing	campaigns.	For	protection,	 the	general	public	sought	refuge	 in	places	such	
as	 underground	 tunnels	 and	 stations,	 basements,	 cellars	 and	 church	 crypts.2	
Consequently,	rudimentary	public	air	raid	shelters	and	air	raid	warning	systems	for	
civil	defence	purposes	were	 implemented.3	After	the	Great	War,	 it	became	apparent	
that	 the	 advent	 of	 aerial	 warfare	 presented	 a	 new	 dimension	 to	 modern	 conflict.	
Theorists	 of	 air	 power	 such	 as	 the	 Italian	 Guilio	 Douhet,	 the	 United	 States’s	 Billy	
Mitchell	and	Britain’s	Hugh	Trenchard	advocated	strategic	aerial	bombing	against	the	




bombardment	 and	 as	 a	 result	 civil	 defence	 emerged.	 During	 the	 inter‐war	 years,	
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airborne	 assaults	 on	 civilians	 in	 the	 event	 of	 war.5	 The	 United	 States	 flirted	 with	
national	 preparedness	 and	 emergency	programmes	 in	 the	 early	 1930s	when	major	
European	 powers	 embarked	 on	 arms	 programmes	 and	 tensions	 escalated.	 Civil	
defence	 programmes	 were	 eventually	 instituted	 in	 1940.6	 In	 1937,	 the	 British	
adopted	the	air	raid	precautions	(ARP)	system	against	aerial	attacks.	It	involved	the	
mobilisation	 of	 civilians	 to	 participate	 in	 a	 range	 of	 activities	 including	 first	 aid,	
evacuation,	 shelters	 and	 warden	 services	 for	 reporting	 incidents,	 providing	
information	 and	 advice.7	 Susan	 R.	 Grayzel	 observes	 that	 as	 aerial	 bombardment	
brought	 war	 to	 the	 home‐front	 “against	 women	 and	 children,	 against	 schools	 and	
homes	 as	 well	 as	 factories”,	 it	 was	 imperative	 for	 the	 wider	 participation	 by	 the	
civilian	population	in	defence	of	their	homes	and	communities.8	
	
	 The	Union	of	South	Africa	 instituted	 the	Civilian	Protective	Services	 (CPS)	 in	
June	1940,	as	a	civil	defence	instrument,	after	months	of	public	prodding,	warnings,	
and	deputations.9	The	South	African	wartime	government	of	General	 J.C.	Smuts	was	
cognisant	 of	 the	 potency	 of	 air	 power	 as	 demonstrated	 during	 the	 Great	War,	 and	





However,	 with	 the	 entry	 of	 Italy	 into	 the	 war	 on	 10	 June	 1940,	 siding	 with	 Nazi	
Germany,	 the	 threat	 of	war	moved	 a	 little	 closer	 to	 South	Africa.	 The	 Italian	 forces	
invaded	and	occupied	Ethiopia	 in	October	1935.	 Suddenly,	 South	Africa	was	within	
striking	 distance	 of	 the	 Italian	 aircraft	 from	 East	 Africa,	 making	 the	 country	
vulnerable	to	air	raids.12	The	reaction	was	however,	very	slow.	The	scheme	for	South	
                                                           

































deal	with	 the	 threat	 of	 nuclear	 bombs.15	 However,	 in	 South	 Africa,	 studies	 on	 civil	
defence	are	limited.	Other	than	the	publications	by	the	advocates	of	civil	defence	such	
as	E.J.	Hamlin16	and	D.S.	Haddon,17	 there	 is	no	scholarly	 literature	on	the	subject.	 In	
1979,	 H.J.	 Martin	 and	 N.	 Orpen	 published	 their	 South	Africa	 at	War,18	 as	 part	 of	 a	
semi‐official	 record	 in	 the	 series	 of	 publications	 compiled	 on	 South	 Africa’s	
participation	 in	 the	Second	World	War.	Although	 the	book	 reflects	 briefly	on	home	
defence	and	internal	security	arrangements,	there	is	hardly	any	mention	of	the	CPS.	
André	 de	 Villiers	 Smit’s	 unpublished	master’s	 thesis	 submitted	 in	 1981,	 deals	with	
civil	defence	organisation	in	the	Cape	Peninsula,	giving	brief	attention	to	its	origin	in	
WWII.19	 Although	 it	 focuses	 for	 the	most	 part	 on	 natural	 disasters,	 this	 is	 the	 first	




South	Africa.	 It	does	so	by	 investigating	 the	home‐front	dimension	of	South	Africa’s	
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involvement	 in	 WWII,	 particularly	 the	 civil	 defence	 efforts	 made	 to	 safeguard	 the	
public	 and	 to	 preserve	 internal	 security.	 Martin	 and	 Orpen	 suggest	 that	 internal	
security	 challenges	 “dominated	 South	 Africa’s	 war	 effort”	 due	 to	 the	 prevalence	 of	
political	divisions	and	objections	to	the	war	policy.21	This	article	will	firstly	examine	
the	political	and	security	context	within	which	civil	defence	and	protective	services	
developed.	 It	 will	 focus	 mainly	 on	 the	 government’s	 security	 thinking,	 threat	
assessment	 and	 defence	 policy	 which	 influenced	 the	 development	 of	 civil	 defence.	
Secondly,	 it	will	 analyse	 the	 institution	 of	 civil	 defence	measures,	 concentrating	 on	









On	 7	 June	 1940,	 the	 South	 African	 minister	 of	 the	 interior,	 H.G.	 Lawrence,	 who	
supervised	 internal	 security,	 accepted	 a	 report	 titled,	 “National	 Civilian	 Protection	
Measures	 for	 South	Africa”.	 It	was	produced	by	 the	Civil	Defence	Committee	 of	 the	
Central	Council	of	 the	 Institute	of	 South	African	Architects,	 urging	and	advising	 the	
government	on	the	need	for	a	nation‐wide	civil	defence	system	for	the	protection	of	





When	 South	 Africa	 entered	 the	 war	 on	 6	 September	 1939,	 the	 country	was	
vulnerable	in	many	respects	and	its	national	defence	was	generally	weak.	The	Union	
Defence	 Force	 (UDF)	 was	 under‐strength,	 inadequately	 trained,	 ill‐equipped	 and	
unprepared	for	any	kind	of	war.25	The	navy	existed	in	name	only	(a	few	sailors,	but	no	
warships)	 and	 the	 country	 was	 relying	 on	 the	 1922	 Anglo‐South	 African	 naval	
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The	 South	 African	 Air	 Force	 (SAAF),	 which	 had	 been	 established	 in	 1920,	 lacked	
modern	 aircraft	 and	 had	 no	 aerial	 warfare	 policy.27	 This	 was	 problematic	 for	 the	
country’s	security	because	the	whole	notion	of	a	civil	defence	system	was	driven	by	
fear	 of	 bombs	 and	 gas	 attacks	 from	 the	 air.	 Basically,	 the	 country	 had	 inadequate	
policy	 direction	 and	 no	 immediate	 defence	 plans	 at	 the	 outbreak	 of	 hostilities.	





	 The	 weak	 state	 of	 South	 Africa’s	 national	 defence	 infrastructure,	 military	
assets	 and	 defence	 policy	 can	 be	 attributed	 to	 a	 number	 of	 factors.	 After	 the	Great	
War,	 many	 national	 economies	 suffered	 depression,	 which	 resulted	 in	 serious	
reductions	 of	 military	 expenditure	 in	 the	 1920s	 and	 1930s.	 Demobilisation,	
rationalisation	 and	 reduction	 of	 military	 forces	 naturally	 followed.	 Because	 of	 the	
economic	situation,	General	J.B.M.	Hertzog,	South	Africa’s	prime	minister	from	1924	
to	 1939,	 pursued	 frugal	 economic	 policies	 and	 curtailed	 military	 expenditure.29	
Another	 reason	 was	 political.	 The	 South	 African	 leadership	 could	 not	 achieve	 a	
consolidated	 vision	 about	 the	 country’s	 defence	 policy.	 There	 was	 no	 agreement	
about	 the	 type	 of	 contingencies	 likely	 to	 be	 encountered	 and	 the	 type	 of	 military	
forces	 required	 for	 the	 country’s	 defence.	 Hertzog	 and	 his	 supporters	 in	 cabinet	
advocated	 and	 pursued	 a	 conservative	 defence	 policy.	 The	 primary	 focus	 was	 on	
limiting	 South	 Africa’s	 defence	 objectives	 to	 the	 country’s	 borders	 and	 not	 foreign	
missions.	 South	 Africa,	 they	 believed,	 was	 too	 remote	 for	 its	 cities,	 towns	 and	 the	
civilian	population	to	be	threatened	with	aerial	bombardment	of	any	significance.	The	
Royal	 Navy	 was	 calculated	 to	 be	 able	 to	 combat	 attacks	 from	 the	 sea.	 Hertzog’s	
defence	policy	 favoured	 a	 focus	 on	 internal	 unrest	 (mainly	 industrial	 disturbances)	
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	 Hertzog’s	 political	 opponent,	 General	 J.C.	 Smuts,	 believed	 differently.	 After	
losing	the	1924	elections	to	Hertzog,	he	often	criticised	the	government	for	its	narrow	
defence	 policy.	 Smuts	 and	 his	 supporters	 believed	 that	 South	 Africa’s	 defence	
objectives	should	focus	beyond	the	country’s	immediate	borders.	Smuts	advocated	a	
more	 modernised	 and	 sophisticated	 military	 force	 capable	 of	 deployment	 at	 least	
“anywhere	in	Africa”,	and	that	imperial	links	with	Britain,	regarded	as	essential	to	the	
security	of	South	Africa,	should	be	maintained.31	When	Smuts	and	Hertzog	formed	a	
coalition	 government	 from	 1933	 to	 deal	 jointly	 with	 the	 problems	 of	 economic	
depression,	 they	 failed	to	reconcile	their	opposing	views	pertaining	to	the	country’s	
defence	 policy.	 Oswald	 Pirow,	 who	 succeeded	 F.P.H.	 Cresswell	 as	 the	 minister	 of	
defence	 in	 the	 Smuts‐Hertzog	 coalition	 government,	 attempted	 a	 five‐year	military	
improvement	 programme.32	 He	 was	 criticised	 for	 making	 bold	 statements	 about	
upgrading	the	military	forces,	but	delivering	very	little	on	the	promised	objectives.33	




authoritarian	 states	 such	 as	 Nazi	 Germany,	 Fascist	 Italy	 and	 Imperial	 Japan,	 which	
displayed	aggressive	expansionist	tendencies.	After	the	Italian	invasion	of	Ethiopia	in	
1935,	 the	 South	 African	 defence	 policy	 was	 reviewed.	 The	 focus	 of	 the	 possible	
military	 deployment	 was	 extended	 to	 East	 Africa.34	 Nevertheless,	 Hertzog’s	
government	 downplayed	 the	 implications	 for	 South	 Africa	 of	 the	 deteriorating	





	 However,	 the	government’s	view	was	not	 shared	by	 the	wider	South	African	
public.	There	were	concerns	about	growing	internal	security	threats.	During	the	mid‐
1930s,	 South	 Africa	was	 subjected	 to	 a	 torrent	 of	 Nazi	 propaganda	 and	 subversive	
activities	 that	 was	 conducted	 through	 the	 German‐based	 Zeesen	 Radio	 broadcast	
service	 in	 the	 Afrikaans	 language	 and	 by	 secret	 agents	 who	 had	 infiltrated	 the	
country.36	 They	 encouraged	 exclusive	 ethnic‐nationalism	 among	 Afrikaners,	
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promoted	 a	 pro‐German	 sentiment	 and	 stimulated	 an	 anti‐British	 feeling.37	 The	
public	was	concerned	about	the	emergent	threat	of	subversion	in	the	form	of	the	fifth	
column,	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 German	 National	 Socialism	 (Nazi)	 in	 the	 country	 and	 the	
proliferation	of	the	pro‐Nazi	movements	such	as	the	Greyshirts	and	the	Blackshirts.38	




Trek	 and	 to	 promote	 Afrikaner	 culture.	 In	 1939,	 it	 developed	 rapidly	 into	 a	 mass	
movement	 which	 was	 considered	 “dangerous	 and	 subversive”	 by	 Smuts.40	 The	 OB	
grew	into	a	political	force	which	threatened	to	undermine	state	authority	and	internal	
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	 In	 March	 1939,	 South	 Africa’s	 military	 chief	 of	 the	 general	 Staff	 (CGS),	 Sir	
Pierre	 van	 Ryneveld,	 produced	 a	 confidential	 memorandum	 urging	 the	
implementation	 of	 precautionary	 measures	 for	 internal	 security.	 He	 requested	 the	
tightening	 up	 of	 police	 protection	 to	 preserve	 internal	 order;	 advised	 that	 police	
reserves	be	placed	on	standby;	and	urged	that	the	Department	of	Information	should	
bring	 censorship	 into	 operation	 and	 make	 arrangements	 for	 the	 protection	 of	
vulnerable	 points	 against	 sabotage.43	 The	 CGS’s	 memorandum	 was	 followed	 by	 a	
secret	 document	 entitled	 “Emergency	 Measures”,	 outlining	 a	 17‐stage	 process	 for	
securing	 vulnerable	 civil	 and	military	 points.	 The	 different	 directors‐general	 in	 the	




The	 government	 was	 alarmed	 by	 the	 possibility	 of	 sabotage	 of	 the	 national	
economic	 infrastructure.	 In	May	 1939,	 the	minister	 of	mines,	 C.F.	 Stallard	wrote	 to	
Pirow,	proposing	a	scheme	for	precautionary	measures	to	preserve	the	key	industrial	
activities	such	as	 transportation,	water	and	power	supply	systems,	 communications	
and	 the	 smooth	 production	 of	 gold,	 steel	 and	 weapons.	 Stallard	 urged	 Pirow	 to	
approve	the	measures	contained	in	the	memorandum	and	proposed	further	steps	to	
take	 in	 the	 event	 of	 an	 emergency.45	Whilst	 the	military	 officials	 attempted	 to	 pre‐
empt	 the	 internal	 security	 situation,	 however,	 Pirow	 displayed	 passivity	 and	
indifference	 to	 the	 proposals.	 Few	 practical	 steps	were	 undertaken.46	 Civil	 defence	
planning	for	the	protection	of	the	public	was	not	seriously	considered.	
	





civilian	 protection,	 prevention	 of	 sabotage,	 and	 for	 establishing	 cooperation	 and	
coordination	of	efforts	between	the	civilian	and	military	authorities	for	emergencies.	
The	 memorandum	 was	 taken	 to	 be	 a	 matter	 for	 discussion	 in	 the	 cabinet.47	 The	
Johannesburg	 City	 Council	 supported	 the	 recommendation	 of	 the	 Cape	 Town	 City	
Council	 to	 establish	 a	 voluntary	 organisation	 to	deal	with	 emergencies	 “which	may	
arise	 in	 the	event	of	war”.	They	wrote	a	 letter	urging	 the	government	 to	declare	 its	
policy	and	to	take	the	lead	in	the	provision	of	the	necessary	precautionary	measures	
for	 protecting	 the	 civilian	 population.	 Furthermore,	 it	 was	 deemed	 urgent	 to	
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The	 municipal	 councils	 of	 other	 major	 cities	 in	 South	 Africa	 also	 received	
requests	 from	 the	 Johannesburg	 and	 Cape	 Town	 councils	 to	 support	 the	




of	 the	 letter	 from	the	Johannesburg	town	council	and	noted	that	 it	expected	further	
details	of	 the	 scheme	 for	 civilian	defence	 to	be	 furnished	 (by	 the	 council)	 at	 a	 later	
stage.	 49	 However,	 the	 office	 of	 the	 defence	 secretary,	 led	 by	 A.H.	 Broeksma,	
considered	the	matter	to	be	related	to	the	ARP	system	and	thus	not	the	concern	of	the	
Department	 of	 Defence.	 On	 this	 basis,	 no	 action	was	 deemed	 necessary	 from	 their	
side.50	
	
	 After	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 war	 in	 September	 1939,	 the	 South	 African	 public	
urged	the	government	to	provide	plans	for	the	protection	of	civilians.	H.	Wilson,	the	
editor	of	the	Cape	Times,	wrote	to	the	newly	appointed	defence	secretary,	C.H.	Blaine,	
proposing	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 voluntary	 organisation	of	 the	 “Civilian	Guards”	 in	
the	 larger	 towns	 and	 coastal	 ports	 to	 assist	 the	 government	 in	 preserving	 internal	




for	 the	UDF’s	 fighting	 forces,	 especially	 for	 citizens	between	 the	 ages	of	 17	and	45.	
Wilson	was	 commended	 for	 “performing	 a	 public	 service”	 and	 Smuts	 also	 gave	 his	
blessing	for	the	development	of	the	civilian	defence	organisation,	but	it	was	only	to	be	
composed	of	 the	citizens	who	were	above	 the	military	age	of	45	years,	 so	as	not	 to	
interfere	with	the	recruitment	for	active	military	service.52	
	
	 The	 military	 officials,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 were	 not	 oblivious	 to	 aerial	 and	
seaborne	threats.	While	the	threat	of	a	 large	scale	 intensive	air	assault	or	sustained	
seaborne	 bombardment	 by	 enemy	 vessels	was	 considered	 remote,	 sporadic	 enemy	
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effect	 on	morale	of	 such	 raids	would	be	 considerable	 if	 no	precautionary	measures	





arrangements;	 auxiliary	 ambulances;	 transport	 organisation;	 communication,	 and	
civil	defence	headquarters.53		
	
There	was	 no	 official	 decision	 for	 instituting	 civilian	 defence	 and	 protective	
measures.	Nonetheless,	the	military	officials	recognised	and	anticipated	the	possible	
threat	 of	 air	 raids	 from	 the	 Germans;	 such	 air	 raids	 were	 already	 taking	 place	 in	
Britain.	They	issued	precautionary	instructions	for	planning	and	preparations	until	a	
definite	 government	 policy	 was	 declared.	 It	 took	 a	 further	 six	 months	 before	 the	
government	 decided	 to	 initiate	 plans	 for	 the	 institution	 of	 a	 national	 civilian	
organisation	 for	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 population	 and	 to	 facilitate	 the	 efficient	
coordination	of	measures	to	deal	with	any	internal	emergency	arising	out	of	the	war	
conditions.54	 This	 was	 long	 overdue	 because	 the	 intelligence	 reports	 were	










conveyed	 by	 the	 minister	 of	 the	 interior,	 H.G.	 Lawrence,	 through	 the	 Inter‐
departmental	Committee	on	internal	security	which	was	set	up	after	the	outbreak	of	
the	 war.56	 On	 31	 May	 1940,	 Lawrence	 announced	 the	 special	 measures	 for	 the	
maintenance	 of	 internal	 security.	 The	 government	 had	 already	 taken	 steps	 to	
safeguard	 vital	 points	 such	 as	 power	 stations,	 railway	 bridges,	 waterworks,	
aerodromes	 and	 other	 key	 economic	 infrastructure,	 by	 establishing	 a	 semi‐military	








56.	 The	 Internal	 Security	 Committee	 was	 a	 strategic	 inter‐departmental	 committee	
comprising	 the	 interior	minister,	 the	 justice	minister,	 the	 police	 commissioner,	 the	






October	 1939.57	 It	 was	 deemed	 necessary	 to	 develop	 plans	 to	 mobilise	 all	 civilian	
resources	 to	 safeguard	 internal	 security,	 to	 protect	 the	 homes,	 villages,	 towns	 and	
cities	 against	 organised	 attacks	 and	 to	 provide	 intelligence.	 This	 effort	 was	 to	 be	





c. To	 immediately	report	all	 cases	of	hardship	 from	whatever	cause	arising	as	
affecting	the	wives	and	families	of	those	away	on	active	service,	with	a	view	
to	prompt	examination	and,	where	necessary,	early	redress.	
d. Generally	 to	watch	 for	 any	movement	 or	 action	which	may	 tend	 to	 impair	
internal	security.59	
	
A	 series	 of	 vigilance	 committees	would	 operate	 in	 the	 Transvaal,	 OFS,	 Natal	
and	 the	 Eastern	 Province.	 However,	 Lawrence	 did	 not	want	 to	 entrust	 intelligence	
work	 to	 untrained	 civilians,	 fearing	 a	 “disconcerting	 embarrassment”	 for	 the	
government	should	things	go	wrong.	To	this	end,	he	recommended	that	the	vigilance	
committees	 should	 not	 enjoy	 official	 government	 recognition	 but	 should	 rather	 be	
run	independently	through	local	security	liaisons.	The	authorities	would	benefit	from	
good	“unofficial”	 intelligence	provided	by	 the	vigilance	committees,	who	would	also	
be	 useful	 in	 facilitating	 the	 spread	 of	 government	 propaganda	 to	 shape	 and	 direct	
public	opinion	in	line	with	state	policy.	60	
	




It	 advised	 the	government	on	 the	 scheme	 for	a	nationwide	civil	defence	 system	 for	
the	 protection	 of	 the	 civilian	 population	 against	 the	 threat	 of	 aerial	 bombing.	
Countermeasures	 proposed	 in	 the	 report	 entailed	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	
comprehensive	 civil	 defence	 capability	 mainly	 involving	 two	 features:	 first,	 the	
military	defence	by	means	of	air	assets,	and	second,	the	civilian	protection	measures	
including	 the	 provision	 of	 air	 raid	 shelters,	 evacuation	 facilities,	 fire‐fighting	 and	
rescue	services.61	With	 this	 in	mind,	Lawrence	suggested	the	establishment	of	what	
he	called	the	Internal	Security	Corps	consisting	of	persons	who	were	not	fully	fit	for	
active	 military	 service,	 to	 deal	 with	 enemy	 attacks	 from	 the	 air,	 the	 arrival	 of	
                                                           













parachutists,	 acts	 of	 sabotage	 and	 internal	 revolts.	 A	 warden	 for	 civilian	 defence	
would	 be	 in	 charge	 of	 controlling	municipal	 services	 and	 performing	 several	 tasks	
such	 as	 preventing	 the	 spread	 of	 fire	 caused	 by	 bombardments;	 the	 demolition	 of	
damaged	buildings;	 first	aid	services;	and	the	removal	of	women	and	children	 from	





civilian	 organisation	under	 the	Department	 of	 Interior,	 authorised	 to	 coordinate	 all	
efforts	regarding	the	protection	of	the	South	African	public.63	Lieutenant	Colonel	T.B.	
Clapham,	 an	 UDF	 officer	 from	 the	 Active	 Citizen	 Force	 (ACF)	 was	 seconded	 to	 the	
minister	of	the	interior	to	organise	the	CPS	as	its	director	on	17	June	1940.64	Under	
Regulations	 36	 and	 37	 of	 the	 National	 Emergency	 Regulations,	 promulgated	 by	
Proclamation	No.	35	of	1940,	 the	minister	of	defence	confirmed	the	appointment	of	
the	CPS	director	and	appointed	the	mayors	of	inland	cities	and	coastal	towns	as	chief	
area	 commandants,	 to	 facilitate	 civil	 defence	 and	 protective	 efforts	 in	 their	 local	
municipalities.65	 The	 CPS	 director	 and	 the	 chief	 area	 commandants	 were	 given	
instructions	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 the	 defence	 authorities	 retained	 over‐riding	
responsibility	 and	 thus	 all	 activities	 pertaining	 to	 the	 CPS	 should	 be	 conducted	 in	




civilian	 population	 against	 attack	 from	 the	 air	 and	 the	 sea,	 and	 against	 the	
dangers	 arising	 from	 sabotage	 and	 sudden	 emergency.	 The	 chief	 object	 is	 to	
organise	 local	 civic	 resources	 (personal	 and	 mechanical)	 to	 deal	 with	 any	





63.	 NASAP,	 CPS,	 Box	 1,	 file	 CPS	 7,	 “Proclamation	 No.	 105	 of	 1940:	 Declaration	 of	
Approval”,	 Secretary	 for	Defence	 to	Director	 Civilian	Protective	 Services,	 16	August	
1940.	
64.	 NASAP,	CPS,	Box	23,	 file	CPS	39,	 “Notes	of	Conference	 regarding	Civilian	Protective	




Circular,	Minister	of	Defence	 (J.C.	 Smuts)	 to	Director	of	Civil	Protective	Services,	 20	
July	1940.	The	mayors	of	 strategic	 cities	 and	 towns	 included	A.B.	 Sidney	 (Pretoria),	
J.F.	 Fotheringham	 (Johannesburg),	 A.T.	 Allison	 (Pietermaritzburg),	 V.G.	 Lewis	 (East	
London),	W.	Brinton	 (Cape	Town),	 J.	McLean	 (Port	Elizabeth),	R.E.	Brown	 (Durban)	
and	R.M.	Scholtz	(Mossel	Bay).	









the	authorities	still	emphasised	 that	 reasonable	precautions	were	 imperative.68	The	
immediate	responsibility	fell	on	the	local	authorities	who	were	required	to	maintain	
contact	 with	 the	 CPS	 director	 to	 “coordinate	 and	 direct	 all	 measures	 for	 the	
protection	of	civilian	in	towns”.69	
	
	 The	 CPS	 organisational	 structure	was	 based	 on	 the	 scheme	 designed	 by	 the	
Johannesburg	City	Council,	which	was	intended	for	local	civil	defence	at	the	outbreak	
of	 the	war.	 The	 council’s	 scheme,	 derived	 from	 the	 British	 ARP	 system,70	was	 also	
shared	with	other	cities	to	adapt	to	their	local	conditions.71	The	mayor,	who	was	the	




thorough	 knowledge	 of	 the	 area	 under	 his	 command	 and	 then	 establish	 a	 control	
centre	from	which	to	direct	operations.	Furthermore,	area	wardens	were	expected	to	
organise	 civilian	 volunteers,	 enforce	 control	 orders	 and	 report	 to	 the	 chief	 area	
commandant	about	events	within	their	sector.	The	chief	warden,	who	was	in	charge	
of	all	 the	area	wardens,	was	required	to	collaborate	with	the	 local	police	and	traffic	
chiefs	 to	 coordinate	 their	 services.	 All	 wardens	 were	 required	 to	 wear	 distinctive	
armlets	with	 “C.P.S.”	 letters	 in	 black	 on	white	 for	 identification	 and	 also	 to	 carry	 a	




Civilian	 Guard.	 The	 ARP	 section	 was	 responsible	 for	 providing	 and	 appointing	
wardens,	medical	services,	mechanical	services,	firefighting,	street	traffic	control	and	
for	providing	 information	 services	 to	 the	general	 public.	The	Civilian	Guard	 section	
was	responsible	for	coordinating	street	patrols	and	assisting	the	South	African	Police	
(SAP)	in	the	general	maintenance	of	law	and	order.74	All	civilians	between	the	ages	of	






















of	 the	CPS	were	borne	by	 the	 local	 authorities	 concerned,	 except	 in	 the	 case	of	 the	
control	and	administrative	costs	of	its	director	and	for	the	chief	area	commanders.77	
The	 government	 undertook	 to	 finance	 uniforms	 for	 the	 Civilian	 Guard,	 to	 fund	
training	 courses	 for	 CPS	 personnel	 and	 to	 supply	 a	 limited	 number	 of	 firearms,	
whistles,	batons,	tin	hats	and	badges.78		
	
	 To	 stimulate	 recruitment	 and	 to	 provide	 publicity	 for	 the	 CPS,	 Clapham	
arranged	 for	 five‐minute	 weekly	 radio	 broadcast	 talks	 by	 different	 mayors	 and	
fortnightly	 talks	 conducted	by	 the	government’s	 information	officer,	Arthur	Wilson,	
who	 was	 also	 the	 director	 of	 the	 state’s	 propaganda	 institution,	 the	 Bureau	 of	










76.	 NASAP,	 CPS,	 Box	 1,	 file	 CPS	 8,	 Directorate	 Civilian	 Protection	 Services	 to	 All	
Municipalities,	 13	 August	 1940;	 NASAP,	 Department	 of	 Justice	 (hereafter	 JUS),	 Box	
1526,	 file	 1/57.40,	 “Volunteer	 Application	 Form	 and	 Attestation	 Form”,	 D.I.	 241,	
undated.	
77.	 NASAP,	CPS,	Box	23,	 file	CPS	39,	 “Notes	of	Conference	Regarding	Civilian	Protective	
Services”,	 26	 June	 1940;	 DOD	 Archives,	 CGS	 (War),	 Box	 224,	 file	 49/13,	
“Memorandum,	 Financial	 Expenses	 for	 the	 Civilian	 Protective	 Services”,	 16	 March	
1942.	






80.	 NASAP,	 CPS,	 Box	 1,	 file	 CPS	 8,	 Directorate	 Civilian	 Protection	 Services	 to	 All	
Municipalities,	13	August	1940.	
81.	 NASAP,	CPS,	Box	21,	file	CPS	21,	“CPS	Policy”,	26	August	1940.	
82		 “Non‐Europeans”	 were	 recruited	 separately	 and	 served	 in	 segregated	 institutions	
such	 the	 police	 and	 the	military.	 See	 provisions	 for	 special	 actions	 to	 organise	 and	










of	 the	 public	 who	 had	 complained	 about	 the	 need	 for	 civilian	 defence.84	 The	 CPS	
existed	 throughout	 the	 war,	 easing	 public	 fears,	 although	 its	 work	 was	 often	







security	 and	 for	 counter‐propaganda.85	At	 the	 same	 time,	 local	 authorities	 in	 larger	
cities	 like	 Johannesburg,	 Cape	 Town	 and	 Durban,	 had	 embarked	 on	 sporadic	
individual	and	uncoordinated	initiatives	to	deal	with	attacks	from	the	air	and	the	sea.	
With	 the	 appointment	 of	 Lieutenant	 Colonel	 Clapham,	 the	 CPS	 began	 to	 develop	 a	
unified	 direction	 and	 operational	 focus.86	 Dr	 E.J.	 Hamlin,	 a	 member	 of	 the	
Johannesburg	City	Council’s	civil	defence	committee	elaborated	on	the	main	tasks	of	
the	 CPS	 for	 the	 city,	 and	 recommended	 them	 to	 the	Department	 of	 the	 Interior	 for	
adoption.87	 The	 scheme	 elaborated	 on	 the	 measures	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 local	
authorities,	including	those	activities	associated	with	the	ARP	section	and	the	role	of	
the	 Civilian	 Guard	 section	 of	 the	 CPS.88	 The	 Civilian	 Guard	 had	 been	 introduced	
during	the	Great	War,	due	to	the	unrest	on	the	Witwatersrand	at	that	time,	to	assist	





control,	 iv)	 mechanical	 services,	 supplies	 and	 maintenance	 (including	 transport,	
sirens,	 black‐outs,	 rescue	 parties	 and	 shelters),	 v)	 non‐Europeans	 (patrols	 in	 black	
areas)	 and	 vi)	 information,	 instruction	 and	 propaganda	 (reports,	 notices,	
literature).90	 Each	 area	 under	 the	 control	 of	 the	 chief	 warden	 was	 required	 to	
coordinate	 and	 control	 the	 siren	 warning	 system;	 black‐out	 system;	 firefighting;	
                                                           









was	 adopted	 by	 the	 directorate	 of	 CPS	 and	 circulated	 to	 all	 municipalities	 as	
instructions	for	implementation	along	the	general	guidelines.		
88.		 Hamlin,	“Civilian	Protective	Services	in	South	Africa”,	pp	145–148.	
89.	 NASAP,	 CPS,	 Box	 1,	 file	 CPS	 8,	 Directorate	 Civilian	 Protection	 Services	 to	 All	
Municipalities,	13	August	1940.	







rescue	 operations;	 traffic	 and	 panic	 control;	 demolition	 of	 damaged	 buildings	 and	
debris	 clearance;	 operating	 mobile	 and	 stationary	 medical	 and	 first	 aid	 posts	 and	













	 The	 commitment	 required	 from	 the	 CPS	was	 not	 particularly	 onerous.	 They	
were	mainly	expected	to	be	proficient	in	the	services	outlined	above.	The	authorities	
emphasised	that	it	was	crucial	to	be	prepared	and	to	maintain	a	state	of	efficiency	and	
readiness	 to	 deal	with	potential	 emergencies	 emanating	 from	 the	war	 conditions.94	
The	CPS	also	enforced	black‐outs	in	coastal	and	inland	cities.	The	system	of	blacking‐
out	 premises,	 street	 lights	 and	 vehicles	was	 considered	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 the	
country’s	defence	against	enemy	aircraft.95	Authorities	issued	instructions	stipulating	
the	 lighting	 restrictions	 and	 the	 provisions	 of	 material	 or	 appropriate	 fittings	
required	 to	comply	with	black‐outs.	The	CPS	members	were	authorised	 to	monitor,	
supervise	and	check	the	buildings	and	vehicles	to	enforce	compliance	with	the	black‐
out	 orders.96	 Enforcement	 of	 black‐outs	 was	 a	 daunting	 task	 for	 the	 CPS	 because	
some	civilians	often	ignored	them.97		
	
The	 CPS	 were	 initially	 considered	 unnecessary	 and	 some	 people	 remarked	
that,	 “we	 are	 too	 far	 away	 from	 the	 enemy	 to	 be	 bombed	 and	 nothing	would	 ever	
happen	in	this	country”.98	When	Japan	entered	the	war,	it	posed	a	threat	in	the	Indian	
Ocean,	and,	along	with	 the	deteriorating	 internal	 security	situation	(due	to	a	rise	of	
                                                           
91.	 UCT,	 Lawrence	 Papers,	 BC640,	 E3.	 138,	 “Circular,	 Civilian	 Protective	 Services	
Instruction	No.	1”,	17	July	1940,	amended	23	June	1942.	
92.	 UCT,	 Lawrence	 Papers,	 BC640,	 E3.	 138,	 “Circular,	 Civilian	 Protective	 Services	
Instruction	No.	1”,	17	July	1940,	amended	23	June	1942.	
93.	 Union	 of	 South	 Africa,	 Government	 Gazette	 Extraordinary,	 No.	 	 3071,	 “Civilian	
Protective	Services:	Blackout	Orders”,	6	July	1942.	
94.	 NASAP,	CPS,	Box	24,	 file	CPS	46,	 “‘We	Must	Be	Prepared’:	Broadcast	by	Colonel	T.B.	
Clapham”,	9	September	1941.		
95.	 NASAP,	 CPS,	 Box	 22,	 file	 CPS	 35,	 “Instruction	 No.	 3,	 Civilian	 Protective	 Services,	
Blackouts”,	6	August	1940.	














Lawrence	 indicated	 that	 the	 CPS	 personnel	 were	 trained	 for	 ARP	 against	
bombardments,	 however,	 their	 services	were	 on	 occasion	 called	 upon	 to	 deal	with	
“emergencies	not	caused	through	enemy	action”.101	He	was	referring	to	the	incidents	
highlighted	 above,	 which	 created	 civilian	 panic	 and	 insecurity	 in	 the	 country.	 The	
Civilian	Guards	in	particular,	performed	police	work,	conducted	nightly	street	patrols,	









There	 is	 abundant	 evidence	 in	 existence	 that	 to	 prove	 that	 there	 still	 exists	 in	
South	Africa	a	dangerous	attitude	of	complete	indifference	to	precautions	…	it	is	
the	common	sense	duty	of	every	citizen	to	 learn	how	to	protect	his	own	people	
and	 himself	 from	 the	 effects	 of	 high	 explosive	 bombs,	 incendiary	 bombs	 and	
poison	gas.	It	is	the	object	of	the	Civilian	Protective	Services	to	provide	essential	







February	 1942;	 “Sabotage	 Plot	 in	 TVL”,	 Cape	 Argus,	 29	 January	 1942;	 “Local	
Incendiarism	 and	Bomb	Outrages”,	The	Friend,	 18	 June	 1942.	 For	more	 details,	 see	
G.C.	Visser,	OB:	Traitors	or	Patriots?	(Macmillan,	Johannesburg,	1976).	
100.	 DOD	Archives,	CGS	(War),	Box	224,	file	49/13,	“C.P.S.	and	Defence”,	P.	van	Ryneveld	to	




102.	 DOD	 Archives,	 CGS	 (War),	 Box	 224,	 file	 49/13,	 “Civilian	 Protection	 Services”,	
Lawrence	to	Smuts,	16	March	1942;	NASAP,	CPS,	Box	22,	file	CPS	35,	“Circular	No.	45,	
Speech	by	Minister	of	Interior”,	27	April	1943.	











raid	 warnings;	 advice	 about	 incendiary	 bombs	 and	 how	 to	 deal	 with	 them;	




to	suit	 local	 conditions.	The	railway	and	harbour	authorities,	 for	example,	arranged	
for	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 local	 siren	 system	 throughout	 the	 railway	 areas,	 the	
black‐out	 system	 and	 the	 rescue	 services	within	 their	 domain.	 The	 first	 aid	 squads	
were	trained	in	the	Railway	and	Harbour	Divisions	of	the	St	Johns	Ambulance	Brigade	
and	 the	 local	 authorities	 assisted	 with	 training	 the	 auxiliary	 fire	 squads.107	 Large	
businesses	organised	 their	 staff	members	 into	 firefighting	 and	 first	 aid	 squads	who	











	 CPS	 members	 volunteered	 in	 accordance	 with	 their	 preference	 (ARP	 or	
Civilian	Guard)	and	in	terms	of	their	profession,	trade,	expertise	or	prior	training,	for	
example,	 in	 the	 medical	 services	 or	 fire‐fighting.111	 In	 addition,	 training	 for	 CPS	
personnel,	 principally	 the	wardens	who	 served	 as	 officers,	 took	 place	 at	 the	 South	
African	 Military	 College	 in	 Pretoria	 from	 1941.	 The	 training	 programme	 entailed	
courses	 in	 passive	 air	 defence,	 air	 raid	 precautions,	 anti‐gas	 measures	 and	 fire‐
                                                           





108.	 NASAP,	 JUS,	 Box	 1526,	 file	 1/57/40,	 Secretary	 for	 Public	 Works	 to	 Secretary	 for	
Justice,	 18	 September	 1941;	 DOD	 Archives,	 CGS	 (War),	 Box	 224,	 file	 49/13,	
“Emergency	 Protection	 of	 Public	 Buildings	 against	 Enemy	 Action	 or	 Sabotage”,	
Secretary	for	Public	Works	to	All	District	Representatives,	January	1942.	




110.	 NASAP,	 CPS,	Box	24,	 file	 CPS	46,	 “National	Broadcast	 by	Regional	 Commandant,	 J.S.	
Fotheringham”,	18	August	1941.	







and	 incendiary	 bomb	 control,	 rescue	 and	 demolition	work	 as	well	 as	 police	 patrol	
work.113	 The	 defence	 authorities	 facilitated	 a	 twelve‐day	 CPS	 training	 programme	
until	1942,	where	the	CPS	was	even	raised	to	become	the	“fourth	service”,	along	with	




and	cities,	 the	 local	 citizens	approached	 local	military	commands	 for	extending	CPS	
operations.115	 Despite	 of	 the	 huge	 demand,	 the	 CPS	 organisation	 was	 not	 without	
problems,	 however.	 Funding	 was	 insufficient.	 The	 CPS	members	 volunteered	 their	
services	without	any	payment,116	while	most	of	 the	CPS	organisational	and	running	
costs	were	carried	by	the	municipalities.117	The	defence	authorities	made	it	clear	that	
the	 country’s	 resources	 were	 mobilised	 for	 military	 requirements	 and	 necessities	
such	as	the	medical	and	surgical	equipment	for	the	CPS	should	be	sourced	by	the	local	
authorities.118	A	 limited	number	 of	 uniforms	were	 paid	 for	 by	 the	 government,	 but	
these	were	only	for	the	Civilian	Guards.	The	police	commissioner	offered	to	equip	the	







112.	 DOD	 Archives,	 DC,	 Box	 3156,	 file	 1651/1,	 Deputy	 Chief	 of	 Staff	 to	 Secretary	 for	
Interior,	17	December	1941.	
113.	 NASAP,	CPS,	Box	19,	 file	CPS	11,	Town	Clerk	 Johannesburg	to	Minister	of	Interior,	1	
April	1941.	
114.	 DOD	 Archives,	 DC,	 Box	 3156,	 file	 1651/5,	 Deputy	 Chief	 of	 Staff	 to	 Director	 CPS,	 2	
October	1942;	“C.P.S.	Raised	to	‘Fourth	Service’”,	The	Friend,	18	June	1942.	
115.	 DOD	 Archives,	 CGS	 (War),	 Box	 224,	 file	 49/13,	 “Minutes	 of	 conference,	 Civilian	
Protective	Services”,	13	January	1942;	DOD	Archives,	CGS	(War),	Box	224,	file	49/13,	
Henry	 Hope,	 Bureau	 of	 Information	 to	 Blaine,	 Secretary	 for	 Defence,	 28	 February	
1942.	
116.		 NASAP,	 CPS,	 Box	 24,	 file	 CPS	 46,	 “CPS	 Broadcast,	 H.G.	 Lawrence”,	 26	 August	 1941;	
NASAP,	CPS,	Box	22,	file	CPS	35,	“Circular	No.	45,	Speech	by	Minister	of	Interior”,	27	
April	1943.	
117.	 UCT,	Lawrence	Papers,	BC640,	E3.	138,	 “Civilian	Protective	Services	 Instruction	No.	
1”,	17	July	1940,	amended	23	June	1942.	














Some	 of	 the	 CPS	 volunteers	 complained	 about	 the	 apparent	 lack	 of	 support	





work,	 yet,	 they	 did	 not	 enjoy	 better	 privileges	 such	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 petrol	 for	
members	using	 their	 own	vehicles	 and	 the	 construction	of	 protective	 facilities.	 The	
municipalities	 also	 protested	 about	 the	 large	 sums	 of	money	 expended	 on	 the	 CPS	
organisation	 and	 operations	 without	 government	 support,	 although,	 the	 state	
treasury	was	 benefiting	 from	 the	 fines	 derived	 from	 court	 prosecutions.	 They	 also	
complained	 that	 the	 government	 was	 not	 taking	 interest	 in	 the	 CPS.123	 The	
municipalities	 implored	the	government	to	make	some	direct	contributions	to	them	
with	 respect	 to	 the	CPS	work.124	The	government	was	not	 swift	 in	dealing	with	 the	
problems,	however,	this	did	not	hamper	recruitment	efforts.	It	was	only	in	1943,	that	








operational	 control	 and	 the	 authority	 of	 the	 CPS’s	 chief	 area	 commandants	 was	
restricted	to	administrative	control,	discipline	and	training.127	It	was	unclear	who	was	
ultimately	 accountable	 for	 and	 the	 main	 authority	 to	 issue	 black‐out	 orders.	 The	
matter	 was	 clarified	 after	 consultation	 with	 the	 defence	 legal	 advisor,	 that	
“operational	 control”	 was	 restricted	 to	 the	 actual	 conduct	 of	 operations	where	 the	
military	 commanders	 retained	 overriding	 authority	 to	 issue	 orders.	 The	 CPS	
members	 would	 be	 required	 to	 execute	 those	 orders	 as	 prescribed.128	 Another	
challenge	was	 the	 refusal	 of	 the	 government	 attorney	 to	 represent	members	of	 the	
CPS	 in	 court	 cases	 –	 such	as	 assault	 charges	–	 that	 arose	 from	actions	 taken	 in	 the	
                                                           


















course	 of	 carrying	 out	 their	 duties,	 for	 example,	 in	 effecting	 an	 arrest.129	 The	




	 On	12	 June	1942,	 the	CPS	Disciplinary	Code	was	published,	which	 regulated	
the	 conduct	 of	 the	 CPS	 volunteers.131	 The	 code	 prescribed	 the	 rules	 for	 the	 CPS	
members	and	penalties	against	them	if	they	committed	any	of	the	eighteen	listed	acts	
of	misconduct,	 for	example,	dereliction	of	duty,	 insubordination,	 fighting	and	absent	
without	 leave.132	 The	 code	 provided	 the	 CPS	 with	 improved	 status.	 However,	 the	
members	 did	 not	 enjoy	 the	 same	 privileges	 as	 the	 police	 or	 the	 UDF.	 They	 were	
unpaid	 volunteers	 and	 in	 most	 cases	 had	 to	 cater	 for	 themselves.	 There	 were	
deficiencies	 in	 the	 supply	 of	 equipment,	 unequal	 distribution	 of	 the	 workload	 and	






A	 sense	of	public	 apathy	and	 resentment	 crept	 in.134	Authorities	 accordingly	
worked	 harder	 to	 stimulate	 interest.	 Through	 the	 radio	 broadcasts,	 it	 became	
increasingly	 apparent	why	 the	 government	 had	 instituted	 the	 CPS:	 to	 reassure	 the	
public	 that	 the	government	was	doing	something,	 to	boost	 their	morale	and	 to	give	
them	a	 sense	of	 “public	 service”	 as	 an	 “an	army	of	 civilians”	mobilised	 towards	 the	
national	 war	 effort	 and	 contributing	 to	 the	 security	 and	 defence	 of	 their	 home	
country.135	 It	 is	 interesting	 that	 despite	 the	 challenges,	 the	membership	 of	 the	 CPS	
                                                           
129.	 NASAP,	 JUS,	 Box	 1526,	 file	 1/57/40,	 “Civilian	 Guards”,	 Chief	 Area	 Commandant,	
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June	1942.	
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of	 the	CPS	 in	 the	 inland	areas,	but	 retained	 those	 in	coastal	 areas	where	black‐outs	







In	 September	 1943,	 the	 directorate	 CPS	 was	 transferred	 from	 the	 Department	 of	
Interior	 to	 the	 Department	 of	 Justice.	 The	 new	 arrangements	 also	 involved	 T.B.	
Clapham,	who	relinquished	his	position	as	CPS	director.	He	was	succeeded	by	Robert	
A.	 Meston	 on	 27	 August	 1943.139	 But	 the	 new	 arrangements	 came	 with	 problems.	
Whereas	Clapham	was	seconded	to	 the	CPS	post	 from	the	UDF	as	a	military	officer,	
Meston	 was	 not.	 He	 had	 previously	 served	 as	 the	 deputy	 police	 commissioner	 of	
South	 Africa.	 Although	 he	 exercised	 similar	 powers	 as	 Clapham	 in	 the	 CPS,	 the	
defence	authorities	refused	to	grant	him	the	military	rank	of	lieutenant	colonel	and	he	
was	 requested	 by	 the	 adjutant‐general	 to	 seek	 approval	 from	 the	 police	
commissioner	to	wear	a	police	uniform.140	Meston	appealed	the	decision	to	the	CGS	
(Van	 Ryneveld)	 for	 reconsideration,	 but	 it	 was	 not	 approved.141	 No	 reasons	 were	
furnished,	 but	 it	 could	 well	 have	 been	 because	 he	 did	 not	 serve	 in	 any	 military	
capacity	either	in	the	ACF	or	the	UDF.	
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the	 conclusion	of	 the	war	 in	Europe,	 the	Department	 of	 Justice	 announced	 that	 the	
CPS	 was	 to	 be	 disbanded	 throughout	 South	 Africa,	 except	 the	 Civilian	 Guards	 and	






easier	 to	wind	down	 its	 services	without	any	major	 incidents	or	disruptions	before	
the	 termination	 of	 hostilities.	 It	 had	 served	 its	 purpose	 as	 a	 wartime	 measure	 to	
safeguard	public	 safety,	 as	 an	 instrument	 to	 sustain	 the	population’s	morale	 and	 to	
mobilise	public	support	for	the	government’s	war	policy.	Hence	the	CPS	was	retained	
until	 the	end	of	 the	war	when	Allied	victory	was	assured	and	 the	potential	 internal	







twentieth	 century,	 and	 the	 fear	 of	 aerial	 bombing	 of	 civilians	 which	 was	 first	
experienced	 during	 the	 Great	 War.	 It	 involved	 the	 provision	 of	 measures	 such	 as	
shelters,	black‐outs,	emergency	services,	warning	systems	and	information	to	ensure	
civilian	 protection	 against	 aerial	 attacks.	 Countries	 such	 as	 Britain,	 the	 USA	 and	
France,	developed	civil	defence	provisions	such	as	the	ARP	system	during	the	inter‐
war	 period	 in	 anticipation	 of	 aerial	 bombing	 in	 future	 conflict.	 However,	 in	 South	
Africa,	 civil	 defence	 preparations	 during	 the	 inter‐war	 years	 were	 virtually	 non‐
existent.	Despite	public	outcries	and	anxious	 letters	 from	concerned	citizens	urging	
government	 action,	 authorities	 did	 not	 believe	 that	 the	 country	 was	 vulnerable	 to	
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the	 authorities	 relied	 on	 the	measures	designed	by	 the	municipalities	 to	 define	 the	
CPS	operational	purpose	and	functions.	The	government	provided	limited	support	for	
the	CPS,	except	giving	it	official	status,	training	and	belated	subsidies.	It	 left	most	of	
its	 financing	 and	 operations	 to	 the	 municipalities.	 This	 presented	 a	 challenge	 to	
institute	 efficient	protective	 services	due	 to	poor	 service	 conditions	 and	equipment	





own	 security,	 thus	 they	 persevered	 and	 supported	 the	 CPS.	 Hence	 80	000	 civilian	
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